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In several important ways Charles Webster's
three books about the National Health Service
resemble Wagner's music drama Der Ring des
Nibelungen. Both achievements are almost
uncritizable monuments to an individual; both
deal with great and ever-present themes; both
show the rise or (usually) fall of major figures;
and, to be flippant, both have inevitable
longeurs (one counterpart to the endless
confrontations between Wotan and Fricka must
surely be the account of NHS reorganization in
Wales).
There such a fanciful comparison should
almost end-particularly since Webster has
written "only" two volumes ofhis epic (though
he brings the story bang up to date with his
paperback political history). Nevertheless, a
series ofLeitmotiven also runs through this
outstanding work, and their development
explains why the NHS has taken its present-day
form. To start with, Webster shows, the NHS
has always been popular: thus at its tenth
anniversary the difficulties were thought not to
be insurmountable, though even then the state of
the hospitals caused anxiety. The latter has
continued, given that the service inherited a
mass ofdecrepit buildings, some ofthem former
workhouses over 100 years old, deserving to be
bulldozed rather than patched, as happens even
today. Moreover, progress in building new
hospitals was slow, the first totally new one (in
Welwyn) not being opened until 1963, while the
plans occasioned by the optimism ofthe 1960s
were dashed by the oil crisis in 1973. In
Webster's view one factor behind all this was
little-Englandism. Even before the NHS started,
health care in other countries had often been
superior to that in Britain, and, once it had come
into being, observers took refuge in phrases
such as the "envy ofthe world" rather than
looking across the channel to see how much
better standards were. Then right from the
beginning the official documents showjust how
deep Treasury parsimony ran, with a lower
proportion ofGDP spent on health care in
Britain than elsewhere. During the lean years
between the Korean war and the Suez fiasco the
NHS was the main target for economies in
social expenditure. In the years ofgrowth the
NHS lagged behind ambitious programmes,
such as defence, nuclear power, roads, housing,
and education.
To be sure, the Treasury had a minimal basis
for its continual accusations of inefficiency.
Suddenly announced plans for expanding the
hospital building programme found both the
health departments and the NHS authorities
unprepared. In a few individual cases (such as
the development of Liverpool and St Thomas's
Hospitals) there was undisputed extravagance
and incompetence. Nevertheless, Webster
emphasizes, virtually all of the many inquiries
found that money had been well spent, and that
any deficiencies arose from lack of it. Behind
all this lacklustredness was the realization that
the health portfolio was a graveyard. Holders
were rarely in the post for long. Ministers
would often not be included in the Cabinet,
where decisions about their department's
spending would be taken. And the appointment
usually signalled the end of a career, David
Owen and Kenneth Clarke being the obvious
exceptions to prove the rule. And, whereas
ministers were expected to fight on their
department's behalf, not all did so-
particularly in the early days of the NHS.
Enoch Powell, significantly a former Treasury
Minister, was the last Minister of Health to
think that economies were possible in his field,
and was acknowledged by the Treasury to be
the most austere of his colleagues.
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What of the heroes and villains in Webster's
stories? Self-evidently Bevan stands out as
inspired, a consummate politician determined
to ignore the pressure for control of the new
NHS by the town hall (Herbert Morrison's
favoured mechanism) and cunningly pitting the
Royal Colleges and hospital consultants against
the BMA and the general practitioners. The
advantages were fundamental. Not only did the
NHS start on schedule; it diffused care more
equally across the country (especially in the
hospital specialties) and provided a decent
safety net. Apart from the grubby, frayed-at-
the-edges services, there were some major
disadvantages-some of which bedevilled the
NHS for a couple of decades, or more, and
others remain even today. General practice was
slow to develop, given the low esteem in
which it was held and the absence of a firm
intellectual or financial footing. The divides
within Britain-geographical, between the
north and south, and the social, between the
various social classes-took a long time to
come to terms with and are still being
addressed. And, crucially, in his initial trade-
off Bevan perpetuated the tripartite divide
between the social services, the hospitals, and
primary care, which remains largely
unaddressed by the successive reorganizations
of the NHS and accounts for so many of its
inefficiencies and unattractiveness to the
consumer. Even worse, public health became a
casualty of the new arrangement (especially
after the reorganizations). Old skills were lost
and new ones, such as the cost-effective
approach to preventative medicine, were not
acquired. The bamboozlement by the tobacco
lobby of successive ministers of health-from
Crossman to Frank Dobson-has been so
effective that we are little further forward in
real action against cigarette smoking than we
were forty years ago, when Doll and Bradford
Hill demonstrated its lethal but preventable
consequences.
Webster's heavyweights are Crossman,
Castle, and Joseph in the classic era, and
Clarke in the recent one. All achieved various
reforms as well as relatively more resources for
their department, and yet all of the first three
left office disappointed and somewhat bitter,
Castle in particular after an unnecessary
bruising confrontation with the doctors over
pay beds, and the self-deprecating Joseph after
introducing further management concepts into
the service. Most doctors would argue for
placing Kenneth Robinson in some sort of
pantheon. Webster, though, will have none of
this, finding him weak and with limited
horizons-as well as responsible for hushing
up the scandals of the long-stay hospitals, an
aspect that his successor Crossman, however
unattractive a bully and self-publicist, was
insistent on bringing into the open. Yet
Robinson was responsible not only for
defusing one of the more serious
confrontations with the profession, but also for
creating the conditions that allowed general
practice to flower and arguably to become the
real envy of the world. Whatever developments
were occurring, general practice had remained
a true cottage industry, sometimes staffed by
doctors who had fallen off Lord Moran's
traditional ladder of excellence, with poor
standards of care, equipment, and premises.
Robinson's acceptance of the family doctors'
charter, with its financial encouragement of
purpose-built premises, partnerships, and
ancillary teams not only staved off a revolt but
enabled general practice to achieve academic
and clinical excellence, as well as maintaining
its cost-effective role as a gatekeeper to
specialist services. Given a confrontationalist
Minister of Health at this critical juncture of
the NHS's history in 1964, its subsequent
evolution would have been remarkably
different.
If lesson there is from Webster's history it is
that without a lot more money-say, the
median of 8 per cent GDP that most civilized
countries spend-the NHS is never likely to
achieve its potential of providing modern care
in clean up-to-date hospitals without untoward
delays. And the proportion of money spent is
not related to the party in power but to the
general economic climate. Too much reliance
has been placed on economy savings by
reorganizations, well documented in both these
books, always without any basis or experiment.
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Yet these have made little difference to patient
care, or to the lives of the workers, and have
not solved the difficulties brought about by the
tripartite structure. All that has been gained
(including by Thatcher's use of the Maoist
ideology of perpetual revolution) is an increase
in the proportion of funds spent on
administration: once an internationally lean
figure of 5 per cent, this is now 12 per cent
and, Webster reports, possibly set to rise to 17
per cent. And under a Conservative
government committed to rolling back the
power of the state and abolishing quangos
there was the paradox of even more central
control.
Quite what the future holds is not a matter
for the historian, but it is ironic that currently
Mr Dobson seems to be going back to the
thinking of 1944 for deciding on the number of
statutory health authorities, when the favoured
figure was forty for a single tier. Given that the
Ring opens with the Rhinemaidens
worshipping the Rhinegold and ends with their
celebrating their newly restored treasure,
perhaps any comparison between Webster and
Wagner is not all that far-fetched.
Stephen Lock,
Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine
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Cambridge History of Medicine, Cambridge
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Over recent years the concept of "identity",
both individual and social, has turned out to be
fruitful across the humanities and social
sciences. Exploring the development of the
professional identity of German, university-
trained physicians between the middle of the
eighteenth and the early nineteenth century,
Thomas Broman utilizes this concept for a
study of the roots of medical
professionalization.
Broman does not employ the usual methods
of tracing monopolistic tendencies and self-
regulative mechanisms of a nascent profession.
Instead, his study is structured in two other
ways: (1) by his attention to theory-practice
discourses, on the supposition that professional
medical practice claims to be based on
scientifically validated theories; and (2)
inspired by Jurgen Habermas, by looking at
academic medicine in the new "public sphere"
that was created by the eighteenth-century
review periodicals for the educated general
reader.
Drawing upon a wide range ofrelevant
primary and secondary sources, Broman
skilfully portrays characteristic features of
eighteenth-century university medicine in the
German territories, without neglecting local
differences. His narrative starts with a view of
the academic study of medicine as a scholarly
pursuit that-with the acquisition of the MD-
gave access to prestigious official positions,
such as town physician (Physicus) or university
professor, in addition to private practice. A first
tension in the traditional identity of the
physician as a scholar is observed as
governments driven by cameralistic ideas put
greater emphasis on the social utility of
medicine. In this context Broman discusses the
new examining powers of several state-
authorized medical boards (Collegia medica),
which issued licences for medical practice, and
the introduction of clinical bedside teaching
into the curricula of many medical faculties.
He further describes an alienation of medical
theory from medical practice, as physiology
became transformed into a science of vital
forces and Naturphilosophie emerged as a
meta-theory of nature with little concern for
practical matters. The followers of Friedrich
Wilhelm Schelling are contrasted with medical
practitioners such as Christoph Wilhelm
Hufeland, who described medicine as an art
and vocation that required talent, dedication to
the patient, and ample clinical experience.
Having thus set the scene, Broman interprets
the brief popularity of Brunonianism in
Germany around 1800, and its public debate,
as the historical attempt of a new generation of
physicians to unify medical theory and
practice. The failure of this attempt opened the
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